Are human rights a morally doubtful belief?

The United States discovered human rights two years ago or five years ago.  Suddenly it’s the main object and leads to a degree of interference with the policy of other countries which, even if I sympathized with the general aim, I don’t think it’s in the least justified.  People in South Africa have to deal with their own problems, and the idea that you can use external pressure to change people, who after all have built up a civilization of a kind, seems to me morally a very doubtful belief.  But it’s a dominating belief in the United States now.

That is F.A. Hayek, in an interview unearthed by Adam Martin over at Aid Watch.

Human rights trouble me less than their blind acceptance. Not least because of the steadily creeping definition.

Recently I’ve been reading Thomas Pogge, who more or less takes human rights as a starting point for a moral commitment to help the poor. He says many things I find compelling (I will blog the book another time) but I was disappointed to see so much taken seemingly for granted.

Not long ago I discussed Michael Ignatieff’s take: human rights are merely useful, and that is good enough. I find this mostly persuasive. If I had to draw the veil of ignorance, not knowing what role or gender or nationality I would receive, I’d be much relieved by a world with human rights.

This is still a fairly weak basis for a global system of morality and justice (and not, I venture, the reasoning for many rights activists). I also do not have a good answer for my libertarian friends (and the little libertarian influence inside me). This philosophical neophyte welcomes recommended reading.

13 Responses

  4. A book I’d recommend is JP Griffin’s “On human rights”, a view from the world of professional moral philosophy, limpidly argued

  5. As you read, you’ll want to distinguish between two claims, as Pogge does. One is a claim about the existence of rights. The other is a claim about obligations corresponding to rights. Your comment suggests libertarians reject rights. They do not. In fact, individual rights are the defining characteristic of libertarian philosophies. They disagree that individuals have positive obligations to help others secure rights. But Pogge’s argument is minimalist in this sense. (Almost) everyone accepts that individuals have certain human rights. And they accept that we have negative duties to not violate those rights. These are both claims that the libertarian accepts. Pogge argues that it follows from this that we have significant obligations to the global poor, because our conduct consists in negative rights violations. So in the South Africa case, it would the western role in contributing to rights violations that grounded the obligation to end apartheid. The obligation to not harm was violated by companies and governments whose activities causally contributed to the violation of black South Africans’ rights ( agree with Saratu here). Pogge is neutral (in his writing) on whether we have positive obligations to others.

    One other thought. I would have thought that thorough enshrinement in international law, widespread agreeement among diverse groups, and being the “common currency” of international public discourse would actually be a very strong basis for global morality and justice.

    On rights, you may consider Beitz, The Idea of Rights, Shue, Basic Rights, and Shue and Goodin, Global Basic Rights. The Sen and Nussbaum recommendations are also quite good.

  7. “Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.” -Jeremy Bentham

  8. Considering the South Africa argument on it’s own, the easy counterpoint would be that if you can stand to not interfere in a morally bankrupt regime’s human rights record, then you ought to not be working with them on the economic front as well. Don’t trade with an apartheid government, don’t have an embassy, don’t work with them in achieving your ends in Angola (like the U.S. did), don’t have any dealings whatsoever.

    To keep your libertarian cred, I think this is fair in general: If your values mean anything, then don’t prop up a regime, economically or otherwise, that uses its power to oppress a people. And if you must acknowledge their “civilization” like Hayek says, then you must be sure that you’re not helping them be ruinous to values you hold dear either.

  9. “Human rights trouble me less than their blind acceptance. Not least because of the steadily creeping definition.”

    I think this is the key point- you can justify freedom from violence and such in a couple of reasonable ways, but it’s the positive creep of things like…well, just read through the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first few sounds very normal. But when you start getting in to the 20s….

  10. Why do we need a strong system for global morality and justice? Morality and justice are human concerns, and so what works is what works.

  11. I’d start with Martha Nussbaum’s “Women and Human Development” — which is more about the latter than the former and thoroughly great book. More recent is Amartya Sen’s “The Idea of Justice” — which looks equally engaging (and I hope to read soon).

  12. It doesn’t refute the ideas, but can we take anything from the fact that he’s calling apartheid South Africa “a civilization of a kind” and arguing for non-intervention?