I am generally skeptical of natural resource-driven theories of conflict, but here is one I find very plausible:
historical examples suggest that natural resource location matters indeed in reality. When the presence of a local ethnic group coincides with large natural resource abundance concentrated in its region, this local ethnic group could be financially better off if it were independent and may under some conditions have incentives to start secessionist rebellion.
This corresponds for example to the separatist movement in the now independent Timor-Leste, and the recent turmoil in the oil-abundant regions of Nigeria. Also the rebellion of the Aceh Freedom Movement in Indonesia starting in 1976 and the armed fight of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army…
In all the cases above, an uneven natural resource distribution was amplifed by ethnic divisions. In contrast, if natural resources are absent or if natural resources (and political power) are evenly dispersed in a country, there are typically few incentives for conáict, even when there are ethnic divisions.
Similarly, when there are large amounts of natural resources available, but the society is ethnically homogeneous, conáict incentives are weak.
That is Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner in a new paper, who go on to develop a formal theory. They make a similar argument for mass killings and genocide.
Comments from readers? The answer matters as (among others) the Pentagon and CIA pay attention to these data and theorists.
11 Responses
Mike is right about Timor. The Timor Sea Gap resources were not well-known (at least not in Timor) during the long period of the struggle for separation from Indonesia, but after that separation was achieved.
Writing from Timor-Leste, I agree with comments from Jen C. & Mike that it would be hard to portray the independence struggle against Indonesia as being either ethnic (the East Timorese are not particularly ethnically distinct from others in the southeast islands) or fueled by control over resources.
However, the unequal distribution of resources was certainly one of the many factors that turned the Timorese against the Indonesians. Had Indonesia made a more intelligent approach to East Timor in 1975, and offered equal standing in a federal state rather than becoming a colony under Javanese supremacy, then perhaps a deal could have been done that benefited all parties. And the same maybe applies to Papua province, where Jakarta seems intent on repeating the mistakes made in Timor-Leste.
But a story about oil in Timor-Leste is not complete without mentioning the role of Australia, which was given a big chunk of the oil rights in the Timor Gap (the portion of sea between Timor and Australia), in return for being so compliant about Indonesia’s illegal invasion. (http://www.economist.com/node/687340).
So in the case of Timor-Leste, the natural resources had not been stolen by Indonesia, but in effect by Australia. Fortunately, Australia has since repented.
Is it stretching too far to throw the American Civil War into this category? Probably.
Calling Timor-Leste a separatist movement is false. Timor-Leste gained its independence from Portugal in 1975 peacefully, and then 9 days later was brutally annexed by Indonesia, which then imposed a 25 year occupation. The key factors in the regaining of its independence include the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the end of the Cold War (Indonesia was a strong ally in the Cold War and the main Timor-Leste political party had communist leanings). The natural resources might have played a role in the occupation of Timor-Leste, but it was certainly not what prompted the independence struggle- Indonesia’s illegal invasion and subsequent wiping out of 1/4 of the population is more what the fight was about.
Would the niger delta have been considered ‘ethnically homogeneous’ had it not been for the conflict and the fact the residents began to perceive themselves to be richer than their neighbors? Is Timor l’este (but not West Timor) a distinct ethnically homogeneous group? South Sudan? Decades of war and perceived wealth have a way of shifting identities in retrospect.
It seems like the identity in both areas was regional, and all of these regions (plus Cabinda, Casamance, Western Sahara, Tibet, etc) had their own administrative histories before the conflict and a relatively well-defined regional identity.
Just from the bit I know of the conflicts they cite — and particularly glaring in citing South Sudan without referencing the Anyanya — the social and sometimes violent conflicts pre-dated natural resource discoveries or at least the clear implications of resources. I think it is pretty clear that that resources affect the conflict’s course, rather than its onset. And maybe extractive industries breed grievances beyond their dubious claim that ‘diamonds and oil resources are important because they can’t be destroyed in war’– has anyone seceded based on their timber or hydroelectric reserves?
I’ve just completed a Masters dissertation on the themes involved in so-called ‘resource conflicts’ and this is certainly not a new type of resource conflict claim. Reducing a conflict to being driven about resources or ethnic conflict, or any other single motivation, runs the risk of failing to consider that civil war is a hugely complex phenomenon. Plenty of research has been done to indicate that the mere existence of natural resources alone is not sufficient to motivate civil war; other factors need to be in play too, and thus must be considered within any comprehensive analysis of conflict.
This doesn’t strike me as a particularly novel insight either. Is this telling us much more than the obvious fact that an uneven distribution of wealth is likely lead to conflict over access and its distribution? I think I remember hearing Paul Collier, for example, telling a very similar story some time ago.
As to the need for natural resource wealth and ethnicity to coincide, I am not convinced. The Katanga secession of the 1960s is a good example of uneven resource distribution leading to (violent) interregional conflict, but due to the region’s and industry’s multi-ethnic nature this wasn’t cloaked in ethnic language. (Ethnic tensions did rise in Katanga sometime later, with the expulsion of the Luba-Kasai, but I know too little about this).
It would seem to me that the crucial variable is not ethnicity per se, but the absence of a strong national public and political sphere, which allows conflicts over distribution to take on a regionallist/nationalistic/ethnic dimension (the distribution of resources between Belgium’s tribes is also very contentious issue), which tends to sharpen conflicts.
As an aside: it has often puzzled me that the Californian tribe is not actively trying to seccede from the burdensome US, given that the latter’s many poor states must doubtlessly be a severe drain on the former’s wealth.
I don’t get it – surely the history of humanity is a struggle for natural resources, land, energy (oil, slaves), food etc. Suddenly now it’s a new theory? How did you think the world worked before this amazing revelation?
Nigerian-Biafran War of 1967-1970. The Ibos (Biafra) had the oil.
Wikipedia has an adequate summary.
I can’t comment meaningfully on those conflicts (although the Aceh prognosis certainly sounds right). I will mention that the ongoing low-level insurgency in Indonesia’s West Papua is fuelled in part by beliefs about the wealth generated by the Freeport copper and gold mine.
There are two issues at hand; it is a single enterprise comprising about 60% of the economic activity of the province, and is seen as a beacon of wealth that could finance an independent state, and it is seen as extracting wealth from poor Papuans. There are other issues at hand as well, environmental and cultural issues related to the mine were emphasised during the 1990s and early 2000s, partly in response to receptive foreign NGOs.
Resource rents have also been a serious issue for the Indonesian military, which has maintained a stronger presence than otherwise justified, and which has an uncertain role in the conflict (it has a rather symbiotic relationship with the small number of armed insurgents).
The reality is of course more complicated than I’ve outlined here and does not fit a simple reduction, but it is hard to argue that the indigenous free-Papua movement would have the same shape if the mine did not exist.
Another data point is provided by the Bougainville conflict in PNG which led to partial secession. While the conflict resulted in the mine at Panguna being shut down, I understand there are now plans to re-open it.