Robert Kaplan writes in this month’s Atlantic in support of the US military’s development of a central Africa Command, or AFRICOM. In today’s Center for Global Development blog I take a look at Kaplan’s claim that increased cooperation between the U.S. military, State Department and aid agencies will improve aid effectiveness and win America more hearts and minds—in his words, the ‘next development frontier’.
This is risky business at best. After spending a few years on the ground working with the UN, USAID and NGOs on the ground in Kenya and Uganda, my sense is that not only is the military ill-equipped to build the community relationships, trust, and participation that are so essential to effective and sustainable development, but any further association of American foreign aid with military and foreign policy objectives is likely to tarnish the country’s image and undermine the effectiveness of American foreign aid. You can see this argument here.
Kaplan goes further, however, suggesting that AFRICOM can be a force for good governance in the region:
AFRICOM, if it is done right, will be a test case for putting the Pentagon and the State Department under one bureaucratic roof: becoming, in effect, a bureau for nation building.
Coordination between agencies and within the government is an important and worthy objective. But a bureau for nation building? Surely, after six decades of mostly failed development initiatives and bungled military operations, a measure of caution and humility is called for?
Our first clue that Kaplan holds a rather optimistic view of external intervention comes from his opening (and favorable) comparison of current American military assistance to French colonial strategy:
The hub of U.S. military activity has been Dakar… where European imperialists first began moving into the interior in the mid-19th century and creating the structure of weak West African states that the U.S. military is now trying to shore up. Without seeking to conquer or govern anything, the American military is pursuing a strategy of security linkages similar to those of the French 150 years ago.
Am I reading this wrong? Is Kaplan suggesting that the main problem with French colonialism that it imposed governance (and weak governance at that) on African subjects by coercive means? Are we to believe that non-coercive military assistance and security linkages are the basis of a better development and security strategy for Africa?
Another view holds that the problem with French colonial policy is that it actively pursued French interests—rapacious economic extraction, national prestige, and national security—not only to the expense of African interests, but under the guise of civilization and salvation. Is AFRICOM really a departure from this model?
The rhetoric around AFRICOM suggests a strategy of subordinating humanitarian and development aims to ones of US national interest and security (all under the guise of development and democratization). Of this we should be profoundly cautious and skeptical. The use of civilizing aid to advance national economic and security interests is not the new frontier of development, but rather the old frontier, colonialism, in new clothing.
3 Responses
A staff member at my old school, the Evans School at the University of Washington, who is also in the Army said during Katrina that the Army should be called in to stop the looting. “You loot, we shoot” was his plan for dealing with the situation. My guess is that this would be the military way to conduct ‘development’ and I don’t think it would work.
Fair enough. I’m very glad to hear that Kaplan doesn’t take the extreme-sounding view that comes across in his article.
I’m still mystified by the military’s interest in providing aid in Africa. Where exactly in Africa is too dangerous for NGOs to operate without the military to step in? Even Darfur is flush with humanitarian aid.
You may have an argument for military-driven or assisted aid in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, I think it’s worth thinking hard about whether invading forces can really be an effective development agency.
The burden of proof is on the military here to demonstrate that this they can be effective and that it is not the product of self-interest. So far they have not adequately made the case, and neither does Kaplan.
I want to preface this by saying I am a US Army Civil Affairs (Army Development/Reconstruction) Specialist and a Graduate student in Development Economics.
To start, I think you should read Kaplan’s new book “Hog Pilots and Blue Water Grunts” and “Imperial Grunts” for a better understanding of his argument. You have certainly read him wrong in this case.
The French colonial system of West Africa used a “small footprint” military strategy: smaller, interconnected units (“security linkages”) across the northern and western part of the continent, in order to establish a base for conquest of resource rich areas to the east and south. To accomplish this, the French had to make sure local African governments, bureaucracies, economies and militaries were weak or non-existent, and dependent on French support/direction. Essentially, anti-development policies.
The only similarity with current US military strategy is in “security linkages:” small US military units across the North and West of the continent. However, unlike the French, these units are trying to STREGNTHEN African militaries through training and joint exercises, in the hopes of extending these training strategies South and East. In order to accomplish this, military training missions must work hand in hand with local development projects to relax tensions with the local population in the short run, and foster a prosperous/liberal environment for healthy militaries/governments to grow in the long run.
So…is AFRICOM really a departure from the French Colonial model? Yes, as you define it….
Rapacious Economic Extraction: No… but, on a side note, Chinese “no strings attached” oil and aid contracts certainly come close.
National Prestige: No…US Military operations in Africa have never gotten much media attention, neither does Africom. Military development projects usually give credit to local governments/militaries to strengthen their reputations, even if we foot the bill/do the work.
National Security: Yes. This is the only similarity. Why is the US Military trying to build African Militaries and interested in developing their economies and governments? Failed states breed terrorism, humanitarian disasters, and civil wars. The US Military (and everyone else) would rather deal with this at a low level before a country collapses. A secondary reason is to have a strong, liberal, accountable military forces in Africa to deal with problems on the continent, as in Darfur.
On a final note, you say in your CGD article that we should leave aid/development operations to those “most experienced and capable, and those unencumbered by weapons and the whiff of self-interest.” First, the Army knows it is not the best at aid/development…that is why its setting up a joint command with Development Professionals on the civilian side to learn and find out how the two sides can compliment each other. Second, and most importantly, the US Army is the only organization capable of conducting any type of aid operations in areas too dangerous for NGOs to work. Those are areas where you MUST be “encumbered” by a weapon, because people are trying to kill you. Some African countries are already at this point, others are not far. So, for better or worse, until NGOs and Aid organizations can provide their own security elements, the Army must perfect its ability to do this type of work.