What role for Western powers in West Africa? Bill Easterly, writing in the Guardian, tells us to take a deep breath and count to ten.
The flurry of the moment is Paul Collier’s proposal that foreign powers give incentives to the Ivoirian army to remove their (arguably) unlawful head of state.
Bill’s point: Collier too calmly and blithely presents us with a risky, unknown, potentially disastrous recommendation. So do many who bandy about a military intervention.
That’s a fair statement. Forget that: it’s a crucial statement. We should write it on our foreheads. Recent history shows us that Western peoples are more than capable of military overconfidence, even delusion, so much so that in the past decade they’ve sent their own sons and daughters into indefinite combat. Twice.
We’d be smart to ask: Just what might we do with the sons and daughters of West Africans?
Even so, if I were the Assistant Secretary of State, or Ghana’s President, I’d lay my head back on the table. I know this is perilous, I’d think. Of course I haven’t clue what the future holds. But is leaving Gbagbo be any less costly or uncertain in its consequences?
Not necessarily for northerners in Cote d’Ivoire. The close colleague of a friend–a northerner, trying to flee to Ghana–just surfaced from detention in a mini-concentration camp run by an ethnic militia, beaten and penniless. He was luckier than some.
What of upcoming elections Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda, and a host of uncertain others on the horizon? I have argued before: the number one threat to continued African stability and growth are the innumerable “new leaders” of Africa who appear unwilling to become Africa’s old leaders. Gbagbo was among the most thuggish, but his peers show great promise.
We cannot advocate against aggression without advocating for an alternative. What is the cost and risk of nonaggression?
Bill has elsewhere argued, vociferously and probably correctly, that democracy and human rights are not an outcome of development, nor a luxury affordable to a few. They are not just essential to economic progress, he says, but are development and progress itself.
The tricky thing with rights and democracy is that they do not necessarily come to those who wait.
If you let me be sloppy with my history, I would venture this: most of us who enjoy rights and democracy owe them to cabals that took enormous, callous, possibly careless risks. Those who succeed we call nation-builders. The ones who fail we call war criminals. (Remember: both Bill and I write from a nation who puts a former child soldier turned genocidal populist on its twenty dollar bill.)
My point is not that aggression is the way to go. If you’ve read my previous posts, with my limited understanding of the politics, I lean towards more peacefully making Gbagbo, and Cote d’Ivoire, pariahs (though even here I fear the terrible risks for Ivoirians).
On reflection, one of the reasons I lean in this direction is that I don’t believe the West, or Cote d’Ivoire’s neighbors, are capable of decisive, consistent, principled, and resolute action—aggressive or not. In a different world I might easily succumb to the view that, along with a large coalition of Ivoirian citizens and politicians, rights and freedoms must be seized, even at great risk and cost.
But we live in a world where dithering and inconsistency are the norm even in nations of strategic Western interest. And one where we look back on previous West African interventions in their neighbors are see the cure as worse than the disease. But as we dither and inact, let’s not assume than nonaggression is any less risky or consequential than the alternative.
Except, that is, for us.
27 Responses
As a new reader and college student, I find this post to be especially insightful into the dilemma dealing with the Cote d’ Ivoire. Though I don’t have the insight that you and your colleagues have, I do think that an interesting take on the use of military intervention would be to see how your and others’ opinions would change/stay the same given this specific circumstance, or taking a look at what your reaction has been to similar circumstances in the past, previous to the wars that we have been engaged in for the past decade or so. Do these current wars make the West question another military intervention more than we would have in the early 90’s ( as I believe to be the case)? Could this be a major contributing factor into why we may just let this problem be settled within the Cote d’ Ivoire. As a US citizen, I don’t see us doing anything extraordinary unless something over the top comes out of the Cote d’ Ivoire that absolutely forces us to take some kind of action.
@ Jacob– I wasn’t meaning to make it trivial– but I just can’t see how they could write that up in any real meaningful way. It seems like it would be a tricky point that would be difficult to enforce. You’d have to account for a lot of factors in specific ways for it to be meaningful, and that would be hard.
I can’t speak as to the intricacies of how Gbagbo’s refusing to cede would be illegal under Ivorian law, but I would imagine that the killings and disappearances being committed under his direction at the very least, would be chargeable under the ICC– who I believe have opened a file to begin investigations. Whether or not that will result in him actually facing charges– who knows. We know from the past that some heads of state and generals are still wanted under war crimes charges and may never see a courtroom. Should it be illegal for a leader to refuse to cede authority in the face of defeat– I would like to believe so; but when it comes to that kind of thing, law is usually not the leader’s top priority and often laws and constitutions get changed at that point to better suit the leader’s needs.
I personal don’t believe in foreign intervention (and that goes for development as well) and have trouble getting behind it unless in extreme circumstance. I know that I wouldn’t want a foreign army invading Canada because of a domestic issue or coming in and telling us how to run our country, but that’s me– and I’m also not in the situation that many Ivorians are in. I just look to past examples of international intervention, and don’t see a whole lot of positive examples that have sprung out from it. It’s a hard point right now. Every option has extreme risks, and every option endangers the lives of civilians. At this point it becomes, which option offers the least risk, the least loss of life– and frankly– I can’t see a clear answer to that.
@Rebecca: “how would that write up?” I’m not sure, but I feel (feel, not know) that if George H.W. Bush really thought he won the 1992 election, and if he relied on loyal generals to keep him in power, that would be illegal. I certainly hope it would be illegal, anyway. How does it write up in America? Would American law allow Clinton to use foreign troops to force Bush out of office? It’s not a trivial question.
“…if those who would carry out the law believe that there is no contest as to who won (Gbagbo)— they wouldn’t believe the law was on the opposition side anyway.” That would be the point of foreign intervention. Hypothetically, UN or American or ECOWAS troops (or whoever) would team up with Ouattara and enforce Ivorian law. I’m not sure what domestic support there would be for that, or whether it would be legal, but doesn’t the fact that the election commission declared Ouattara the winner mean something?
I can’t help but feel that Gbagbo’s refusal to cede authority might well be illegal under current Ivorian law, and so might the behavior of his generals. If it isn’t, shouldn’t it be? The question of foreign intervention is probably a stickier issue, am I wrong?
Got cut off there:
The point is that any intervention troops would be severely outnumbered by local militias and armed groups within the country and would have difficulty making a clean sweep if these groups decided they weren’t so happy about intervention. And what I mentioned above doesn’t even begin to mention some of the other less-formal militias and armed groups in the country.
Rebecca,
You seem to conveniently forget that 54% of the people here voted for Allasane Ouattara. Do you really believe that those 54% will not have their local militias and armed groups that will support an intervention force? Let us also not forget that about 25% (5 Million) of the population in Cote d’Ivoire are foreigners that would love to see the rear end of Gbagbo and his thugs. Also, don’t forget that 65% of the armed forces voted for Allasane Ouattara.
Quoting Venance Konan, a local author and activist, on a military intervention force, “.. better a terrible end than terror without an end.” http://venancekonan.com
@Chris — I think that that is exactly the problem. There are so many groups that would get involved in the fight that it would be a real bloodbath in the case of an intervention. It would hardly be a quick “in and out” mission. It would be all out war in the most populous city in the country.
Also, the 65% of the armed forces voting for Ouattara is propaganda. We are to believe that the armed forces voted in higher percentages within the army than in the general population even though they’ve long been stacked in Gbagbo’s favor?? Show me one reputable site that says this, please. So far the only ones I’ve seen making this claim are in Ouattara’s camp and I’m sorry– but I’m not about to believe that. Where’s the proof behind that claim?
There will be no “all out war in the most populous city in the country” as you seem to predict. I will not go down that path with you, sorry. This fear of “whole scale machete slaughter” is what you foresee and what Gbagbo and Ble Goude would like the world to believe if they were to be dethroned. Once real guns enter the arena, all the orchestrated attacks on the UN which are simply based on the knowledge that they never shoot back will cease. Gbagbo and Ble Goude have the jobless youths ready only with promises to plunder and loot. Faced with real bullets, they will think twice. Faced with real bullets the opposition youths will also think twice.
A free and fair election took place in Cote d’Ivoire and one party won and another lost. In your native Canada when elections take place, the losing party goes home and waits five years for their next chance. The same sentiments hold true here in Cote d’Ivoire. Ivorians are not savages that will go out buy machetes to slaughter their neighbours because their party lost an election? This is also a civilized society. Just because one village chief holds the nation and whole continent hostage with threats of violence does not mean that people are ready to go slaughter each other for him. The sentiments being aired on national TV are very different to the realities on the ground. Ivorians are far from stupid.
The Ivorian armed forces are decorative and have been starved of any power since 2000. I am sorry I cannot point you out to a reputable web-portal that says that the army voted 65% in Ouattara’s favour. You are free to believe it as Ouattara propaganda. As with most armies in the world, it is people from disadvantaged backgrounds that mostly join armed forces. The same holds true for Cote d’Ivoire, and the disadvantaged people are primarily northerners. Gbagbo may have succeeded in stuffing the police with his tribesmen, the Betes, but not the other forces. The old guard in the armed forces never allowed this to happen which forced Gbagbo to create funny “elite” units like the CECOS charged with “fighting crime”. Gbagbo was also as silly as the concentrate all heavy weaponry with a handful of his Republican Guards who can’t even operate the arms. It is something that is already haunting him and has the old Guard saying “we told you so”. Gbagbo never expected an outside force to invade let alone the whole world as is the case now. All he did was re-arrange the armed forces in way that they would not harm him and continue to be a threat to the population. All his strategies with the armed forces are backfiring on him. Just last week his very own police were threatening mutiny because they were being killed trying to suppress the people of Abobo. They were asking “why do they not send in the Republican Guards? Those are the ones with the weapons and talk most loudly about their undying support for the president? Why us and not them?” The armed forces are not going to fight against the world for Gbagbo. They are not ready to die for some jaundiced nationalist agenda. They are not stupid. On the 16th December, they were the first ones to abandon their vehicles and take off their military fatigues and run half-naked after the “rebels” at the Golf hotel fired a few shots in the air? The Republican guard were the first to abandon their positions besieging the Central bank on Tuesday when a tank that was part of Raila Odinga’s security detail drove past?
@Chris– you are spouting propaganda straight from the opposition papers. 65% of the army voted for Ouattara? There’s a reason you can’t find that in any other place– and that’s because it’s bullshit. Gbagbo’s police were threatening mutiny– more bullshit. They abandoned their vehicles on the 16th– more and more bullshit. This is all just more examples of the lies that are being spread around this country through the local papers– the opposition papers and radio are just as bad (if not worse) than the state ones.
And all out war is actually an extremely likely possibility– read any of the African military analyst reports right now. Why do you think they are having trouble debating whether to invade? Because it could end in bloodshed. Don’t be naive and stop reading the opposition newspapers and spouting it as fact– because it’s just as irresponsible as reading the state newspapers and spouting it as fact. They are both full of crap.
Dear Anonymous,
Your language surely is colourful. I didn’t know the opposition papers had written all that! Poor me, I though I was privileged and connected being a man of the forces myself. If it may interest you, I was at the Golf hotel on the 16th December and cannot read French.
Tip: Real military specialists get a paid handsomely and and do not go defecating on the internet. You may benefit from a subscription with Janes.com
So Chris, you’re at the Golf Hotel and you want us to believe you are being persuaded by the Ouattara camp at all? Seems likely. All that you are saying is coming directly from the opposition newspapers, so it seems like you are getting fed a load of propaganda there are are buying it. I don’t believe for a second that you saw soldiers “running half naked” down the street after shots were fired. That’s why the battle there went on for how long?? Yes, must of just been the FN shooting at themselves then for hours.
And you can’t even read French and you want us to believe you can actually do any useful research in the country?? Come on now. You clearly have no idea what you are talking about and are spreading propaganda that someone has fed you. Next time, try actually learning the language BEFORE you pretend to be an expert in a country. How exactly are you getting the news here then, if you don’t know French?? International papers and what you can see out the window of the Golf Hotel? Sound about right?
I didn’t claim to be a military specialist– I merely said you should actually READ some of the analyses provided by the African military analysts before you start saying things you clearly don’t know. I bet you won’t find one that doesn’t suggest that all out war in the city is extremely likely.
@Chris K– While it may be true that in certain parts of the world the disadvantaged enter the army, this is certainly not the case in Cote d’Ivoire. There is big competition to get in here, and it is actually well known that you have to bribe to be able to get in the army (I’ve heard on average one or two million CFA) or at the very least, you have to know people. They have to take an exam to get in, which they have to pay to be able to “pass”. I don’t know any “disadvantaged” person here who would be able to come up with a million CFA. Where are you getting this information or are you just speculating?
As to the question of the Republican Guard on the Central Bank– they are still there in place this morning and haven’t ever left. The only place I’ve even seen this statement is in some heavily pro-Ouattara papers. I’m curious who told you that information because it’s certainly not true– go pass by there today. I’d also have to agree with the anonymous here, the battle at the Golf Hotel went on for quite more than a few shots in the air– and the hotel still remains blockaded to this day by the soldiers. If they jumped ship, as you suggest– who’s there now blockading it? Who continued the battle that day?
I don’t think that “Ivorians are savages that will go out buy machetes to slaughter their neighbours because their party lost an election”, but I certainly do believe that the tens of thousands of armed groups that exist on both sides with stakes in the outcome will fight it out because it is in their interest to do so and that when bands of marauding militias are all around, the population usually arms itself for protection. Add foreign armies to the mix, and you’ve got bloodshed. Cote d’Ivoire isn’t any less “civilized” than Canada, but that doesn’t mean we can analyze them in the same light. Canada didn’t just come out of a civil war in the past decade, and also doesn’t have opposing armed militias supporting our political parties. Kind of makes a difference to the levels of violence that are going to be seen following political conflict.
From the Horses mouth yesterday… The head of the European Head of the Observer mission to Cote d’Ivoire
Question: Some 200 hundred people died in the election-related violence. What is the situation now in Ivory Coast? Is there a risk of civil war?
Cristian Preda: “…. The tension can lead at any time to violent clashes. Even more so, as the army is split itself, more than 60% of the military staff having voted for Ouattara in the second round….”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/030-112304-021-01-04-903-20110121STO12291-2011-21-01-2011/default_en.htm
@Anonymous Rebecca,
How do disadvantaged people in Africa make it on a plane to seek asylum in the western world? Rebecca, you seem to have no understanding of community dynamics in African society .. Unlike Canada, the extended family and friends pool money for weddings funerals school fees.. you name it. The money is not the point. Bribing to get into the forces is a legacy of Gbagbos mismanagement of the country, it is a recent phenomenon. Don’t forget that you pay bribes to get into any school or get a job in Ivory Coast. The Ivorian army was not built yesterday and has history. Go figure. If you were informed, the Gendarmerie held a meeting some 2-3 weeks ago to get general consent in their support for Gbagbo. They did not get the response they were looking for. Fact remains, over 65% voted for Ouattara.
As to the question of the Republican Guard legging it from the national Bank when armoured vehicles that were part of Raila Odinga’s security detail passed by. Go ask anyone working in that area and they give you the score. Your brave boys guarding the BCEAO legged it. This is not about them still being there, it is a a question of the Armed forces preparedness for a war they do not believe in. Think about it.
The Golf hotel battle: Rebecca, the Republican guard put up their checkpoints on the afternoon of the 15th December. The march to RTI was announced to start at 8 am. Even the press had already gathered at the hotel to follow the march at that time. The FN soldiers went down the road to clear the road block and fired a few shots in the air where your brave boys legged it leaving everything behind including their clothes. The brave boys did not jump ship as you suggest but ran away half-naked to get reinforcements. The battle started at about 10:00 and lasted until 14:00. The sad part is that you are missing the point. I am talking about the morale of the troops that voted 65% for Ouattara and not whether the brave boys have invaded the central bank or manning the blockades..
Your predictions of bloodshed and possible genocide if Gbagbo is removed certainly suggest that “Ivorians are savages that will go out buy machetes to slaughter their neighbours because their party lost an election”. Do not forget that the opposition youth are quiet because they have guns trained on their faces and are being killed by the police nearly every other day. A third party, like an ECOMOG force with a mandate to shoot, will have exactly the same effect on Gbagbos youth. The armed militia you talk about are certainly and almost exclusively only from Gbagbo’s side. have a peek at the HR watch report and EU observer mission issued recently.
HRWatch Report: http://bit.ly/gC5D4a
EU Observer report: http://bit.ly/gzXqzW
Cristian Preda interview: http://bit.ly/f3M61J
Again quoting Venance Konan, a local author and activist, on a military intervention force, “.. better a terrible end than terror without an end.”
http://venancekonan.com
@Anonymous Rebecca,
How do disadvantaged people in Africa make it on a plane to seek asylum in the western world? Rebecca, you seem to have no understanding of community dynamics in African society .. Unlike Canada, the extended family and friends pool money for weddings funerals school fees.. you name it. The money is not the point. Bribing to get into the forces is a legacy of Gbagbos mismanagement of the country, it is a recent phenomenon. Don’t forget that you pay bribes to get into any school or get a job in Ivory Coast. The Ivorian army was not built yesterday and has history. Go figure. If you were informed, the Gendarmerie held a meeting some 2-3 weeks ago to get general consent in their support for Gbagbo. They did not get the response they were looking for. Fact remains, over 65% voted for Ouattara.
As to the question of the Republican Guard legging it from the national Bank when armoured vehicles that were part of Raila Odinga’s security detail passed by. Go ask anyone working in that area and they give you the score. Your brave boys guarding the BCEAO legged it. This is not about them still being there, it is a a question of the Armed forces preparedness for a war they do not believe in. Think about it.
The Golf hotel battle: Rebecca, the Republican guard put up their checkpoints on the afternoon of the 15th December. The march to RTI was announced to start at 8 am. Even the press had already gathered at the hotel to follow the march at that time. The FN soldiers went down the road to clear the road block and fired a few shots in the air where your brave boys legged it leaving everything behind including their clothes. The brave boys did not jump ship as you suggest but ran away half-naked to get reinforcements. The battle started at about 10:00 and lasted until 14:00. The sad part is that you are missing the point. I am talking about the morale of the troops that voted 65% for Ouattara and not whether the brave boys have invaded the central bank or manning the blockades..
Your predictions of bloodshed and possible genocide if Gbagbo is removed certainly suggest that “Ivorians are savages that will go out buy machetes to slaughter their neighbours because their party lost an election”. Do not forget that the opposition youth are quiet because they have guns trained on their faces and are being killed by the police nearly every other day. A third party, like an ECOMOG force with a mandate to shoot, will have exactly the same effect on Gbagbos youth. The armed militia you talk about are certainly and almost exclusively only from Gbagbo’s side. have a peek at the HR watch report and EU observer mission issued recently.
HRWatch Report: http://bit.ly/gC5D4a
EU Observer report: http://bit.ly/gzXqzW
Cristian Preda interview: http://bit.ly/f3M61J
Again quoting Venance Konan, a local author and activist, on a military intervention force, “.. better a terrible end than terror without an end.”
http://venancekonan.com
Look, I just want to make this perfectly clear: I do not support Gbagbo and never have, so please don’t suggest that his troops are “my” boys. I find Gbagbo, Ble Goude (and others) and their actions morally repugnant. The man has done and will continue to do great evil among the population here, and needs to leave office if any semblance of peace is to ever be found in this country. Where I differ from you is that I don’t think that military intervention is the way to properly achieve this. Military intervention will not bring peace upon this nation; I believe it will only escalate the problems and create further divisions among the population. There are too many armed factions at play here, with conflicting interests for this to run smoothly. You will have revolt, whether it is the 35% of the army that are die-hard loyalists who didn’t supposedly vote for Ouattara (that would still be in excess of ten thousand men, not to mention the other loyalist factions) or have the FN take place within the city to help install Ouattara–there will be fighting and it will be the population who suffers from this. It is not the least risky option; it is one of the most risky, which I think is part of the reason ECOWAS has not yet invaded. Look at past interventions of ECOMOG, have they been quick in and out maneuvers, or long drawn out wars? The ECOMOG force has long been problematic, with each country’s troops being directed by their own leaders and not the mission command, to the detriment of the overall mission. There has also been a history of problems of abuses being committed by the troops (see http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/liberia/#6) that is certainly a risk to happen again.
If, as the current media suggests, the financial squeezing is actually working and Gbagbo will soon be out of all money–then wouldn’t a better option would be to send in professional mediators–not diplomats with biases– to make a real move. If he is truly out of money, it will not be long before he has no other option but to leave and he’ll want to do that with the most power and comfort possible, so mediation would become an attractive option for him at that point. There are many other options, and intervention that has a possibility of striking a full out war is not the best of those.
@ Pauline– I agree that it is important to include the Generals in any resolution strategy.
And please, by all means, provide the proper figures then with links to where they were found. I’d be very interested. I have found these figures in more or less the same amounts in several locations, but if you have others– I’d like to read them.
“Let’s not assume than nonaggression is any less risky or consequential than the alternative.” And, let’s not assume that doing nothing now is less risky or costly than a military intervention that’s prompted by an actual civil war. Here is where the examples of Liberia and Sierra Leone come in. The international community can choose to have the Ivorians fight it out among themselves, which is what is going to happen if this impasse is not resolved. Collier made a valid point in saying the loyalist army chiefs should be involved in any mediated conflict resolution strategy. Gbagbo clings to power by the grace of his generals. Talking to him alone is not enough. His generals need to be presented with an alternative as well. @Rebecca: it would be wise to refrain from speculating based on your figures, which you have gotten completely wrong.
@Jacob– Collier is definitely not a scholar of Ivorian law, and frankly, from his clear misunderstanding of the conflict– he’s not up to speed on Cote d’Ivoire’s political situation either…. sorry, just had to point that out.
I don’t think you could find a legal/constitutional basis for forcing a president who has lost out of office within domestic law. If that were the case, they would have used it long ago. Besides, how would that write up?
Something along the lines of, in the case of a dictator refusing to leave, the opposition has the right to bomb the presidential palace…
The problem is, that the force who would be best able to remove Gbagbo from power, is also the force that is strongly loyal to him. Even if you had a legal basis for a coup/counter-coup, if those who would carry out the law believe that there is no contest as to who won (Gbagbo)– they wouldn’t believe the law was on the opposition side anyway.
@Chris and @Rebecca, thanks! Reminds me of Hanukkah.
I have a question for any scholars of Ivorian law out there (Chris? Collier?)–is there any legal/constitutional basis for forcing a president who has lost an election out of office? If so, would an attempt by the US/ECOWAS/junior officers/whoever to force Gbgagbo out of office even count as a coup? Wouldn’t that make it a counter-coup or something? Alex, is that the kind of specificity this sort of debate could use?
“But is leaving Ggbabo be any less costly or uncertain in its consequences?”
That’s a good question. I tend to think that whatever happens at this point, there are tensions among the population that are not easily going to go away. If Ouattara does somehow get installed and takes over, I think we shouldn’t be naive to think that the rebel FN forces will quietly forget those who opposed them. There will be political killings here, no matter who is in charge. Will they be less under Ouattara– maybe. The violent rhetoric being spouted in the opposition media is just as fierce as that of the state media, a point that is being mostly ignored in the international media. Either way, I think you are likely to have political disappearances, killings and violence that will continue until the “threat” to power has been “neutralized”. All options present risk.
@Alex– “Talking numbers, I think, would reveal that a lot of proposed interventions are simply impracticable.”
Herein lies the problem. While the “west” and certain African parties are puffing up their chest and making idle threats, it seems that really don’t have the capabilities to do the job. ECOWAS has 5,500 troops at its disposal, IF, they all actually wanted to fight in this fight– and it seems Ghana (one of the top contributors) won’t, and Nigeria (the top contributor) can’t until at least after its own elections later this year.
The US apparently has a 2,000 man Marine unit available, but it would be highly unlikely for them to invade in an African country as this would be political suicide for any leaders who pushed for it. Plus, they are cutting back military missions over the next several years and losing their budget. France has already said it won’t invade and no other EU country will if France doesn’t take the lead.
Gbagbo has 4,000 FDS troops, thousands of anti-riot police, the CESOS and more than 30,000 military forces. The rebel army Forces Nouvelles are said to have approximately 4,000 troops, mostly lightly armed, though locally I have heard of some heavy weapons now being stockpiled in certain Abidjan neighbourhoods from both Gbagbo and Ouattara supporters alike. I wrote about the different risks associated with each of the proposed “solutions” here if you are interested: http://apeaceofconflict.com/2011/01/08/is-peace-a-possibility-for-cote-divoire-in-2011-part-2/
@Jacob– I think the confusion over the name spelling is because of the transliteration process, since these are not English names. I’ve also seen Ouattara’s name spelled as Wattera and Oattara (and about a dozen other ways). They are pronounced more like Bagbo and Wattera if it helps.
Prof. Collier pushes “a coup from lower-ranking officers” who “would find this an attractive strategy for accelerating their careers.” Granted that Joseph Mobutu, Saddam Hussein, and Idi Amin had risen to higher stations by the time they seized power in their respective countries, didn’t the ambition of “accelerating their careers” move each of these men? I concede that personal ambition excludes neither love of country nor the ability to govern wisely. But wouldn’t the invitation to a coup attract also the personally ambitious who lack both patriotism and political wisdom? The fact that Collier argues a nearly identical point in The Bottom Billion makes his recent recommendation especially startling.
A few thoughts:
1) Can we all agree on the spelling of Gbagbo’s name? You have it spelled Ggbabo, and I’ve seen it spelled Ggagbo in a few news stories, but most sources have it spelled Gbagbo. What’s going on?
2) Love the Jackson reference.
3) “Indefinite” “combat”? That’s just redundant. Except for Granada; nothing indefinite about the U.S. invading Grenada.
It is Gbagbo. I misspelled it my first time and since then my spell-checker runs wild with the misspelling. Thanks for the catch. I’ve fixed this.
Great point about asking what the risk and cost of nonagression is. I’d say that there have been dictators that have been so brutal that aggression was clearly the least costly option. Pol Pot and Idi Amin for example were both removed by military interventions (instigated by Vietnam and Tanzania respectively) and were both replaced by non-democratic regimes, but it’s still pretty clear that the people of Cambodia and Uganda benefited greatly from the interventions.
So it’s a big difference between dictators that occasionally put opposition politicians in prison and dictators that mass murder their own population.
The question is what type of dictator Gbagbo is. One starting point to answer that question would be to read human rights reports about the Ivory Coast from Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, UN HRC, Reporters Without Borders etc.
Reading suggestions:
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/cote-d%E2%80%99ivoire-injured-protesters-denied-medical-care-2010-12-17
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/deadly-raid-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-opposition-headquarters-condemned-2010-12-02
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91573
http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20101218-violences-arrestations-partisans-ouattara-grand-bassam-cote-ivoire [In French]
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/23/c-te-d-ivoire-pro-gbagbo-forces-abducting-opponents
I find that a lot of conversations about military intervention are short on specifics. Advocates of aggression rarely cite the troop numbers, budgets, and time that might be needed in such missions. Talking numbers, I think, would reveal that a lot of proposed interventions are simply impracticable. So the idea that the US has a real choice between aggression and nonaggression might be false to begin with.
As for encouraging military takeovers, sometimes a military junta proves willing to hand over power to civilians (Niger, so far), and sometimes not (Guinea, under Camara). And the way things played out in those cases, it seems to me, had more to do with the internal dynamics of those countries than with what the West did. Western pressure may have reinforced the Niger junta’s democratic aspirations, and the West was able to exploit Camara’s wounding to spur change in Guinea, but in neither case did the West dictate what happened.
I wish I knew. Fortunately for us, we don’t. That terrible task is left to Presidents, ministers, military chiefs and their advisors (who hopefully have more experience at these choices than the junior academic blog writer).
I write these things in the vain hope that, once in a while, an advisor to an advisor will read it and see a different side of the problem or think twice about a particularly risky action. Or maybe it’s a useful lesson to an advisor in 2031, currently in grad school, who actually has the time to read blogs at this stage of their career.
Well, as I’ve said before – all the options leave us open to massive uncertainty. Has anyone done any serious analysis on what the exact risks are of every option? I haven’t seen one, but I think in all cases it would probably say something like ‘quite likely to be something between unfortunate and disastrous’.
So in this case, how do we choose?