# PPHA 32740
# Order & Violence:
# (Political Economy of Development)
# Spring 2019 Syllabus

Chris Blattman
UChicago Harris Public Policy, Room 2009
blattman@uchicago.edu
http://chrisblattman.com
Office hours sign-up

April 1 2019 version

# Part I
# Course information

How detailed and anal retentive can a syllabus be? You're about to find out! Please read
Part I thoroughly.

**Teaching assistants**

**Miguel Morales**   mmoralmo@uchicago.edu
PhD candidate, Harris Public Policy
Office hours: TBA

**Chinmaya Kumar**   chinmayak@uchicago.edu
PhD candidate, Harris Public Policy
Office hours: TBA

**Lecture time and location**

Mondays and Wednesdays 2:00–3:20 pm in Keller Center 1022

**Certificate eligibility**

This class fulfills both the international development and the conflict certificates at Harris.

**Prerequisites**

The Harris core classes are recommended, especially the analytical politics sequence. Non-Harris students should have some familiarity with introductory economics and game theory. Note that MAIDP students should take PPHA 57400 (Political Development & Policy), a highly similar class, and may not receive credit for this class.

**Pass/fail and auditor policies**

I am happy for people to audit the class so long as there are extra seats. I am also happy for students to take the class pass/fail provided there is no excess demand for the class above the current class limit. If there is excess demand, then I will prioritize students taking the course for a letter grade. Note that the class will not qualify for the conflict or development certificates if you take the class pass/fail.

# What this course is about

Over the past few decades, most low- and middle-income countries have enjoyed growing economies, more order, and greater freedom. Some countries, however, remain poor, violent, or unfree. What explains why some countries have moved along a path of "political development" while others have not?

Moreover, fifty years on, a lot of smart people are genuinely surprised that these countries' leaders have not been able to make more progress in implementing good policies. With so many good examples to follow, why haven't more countries adopted the policies of the high performers and achieved similar peace and prosperity?

Finally, decades of outside intervention have had mixed results. Did foreign aid, democracy promotion, peacekeeping, and maybe even military intervention have promote at least some order and growth? If not, why not, and what can you do about it as citizens or future policymakers?

This class is going to try to demystify what's going on. There are good explanations for violence, weak states, and undemocratic regimes. There are some good reasons leaders don't make headway, bureaucrats seem slothful, and programs get perverted. The idea is to talk about the political, economic, and other social scientific logics that lead to function and dysfunction.

To understand the politics of weak or unstable states, we are going to start with some theory and history. We need a theory of violence, and theories of how states, institutions, and societies develop to curb violence. And we also want to look at the impacts of Western nations and their own development on the world, over a wide sweep of history. So in part this class is a history of world development, especially political development.

We will also talk about policies, and how order and development can be fostered. This course will not tell you what specific programs or reforms to focus on, or how to implement them. What we can do is try to understand some of the big ideas about why some paths lead to success or failure, as well as why the best plans so often go awry—ideas that surprisingly few development practitioners ever acquire.

I designed this course to give students an appreciation for big ideas and theories in comparative politics, international relations, political economy, sociology, geography, and development economics. This class involves reading *a lot* of material, and building your conceptual and historical sense of development and politics. Reading = success, and more interesting class discussions.

This is a global class, but a slightly unbalanced one. A lot of the examples are going to draw on Africa and Latin America, with a good deal on historical European and U.S. development, plus a little material on the Middle East and Asia. This balance is determined mostly by what I know well, and what I am ignorant of.

I won't have the concrete policy answers in many cases. Actually, no one does, and one of my big aims in this class is to help you learn enough and think critically enough to know why everyone with a clear solution is wrong, and why "peace-building" and "development" are the hardest things in the world. There is no single answer. But there are some principles to finding the right answer in the right situation, and history to learn from. That's what you're signing up for in this class.

# Grading

Because this is a spring course and most of you are graduating, I need to submit your grades by June 7! Therefore I cannot offer a real final exam. Instead I am going to try a set of weekly assignments and essays. This will spread the work across the full quarter, and you will need to keep up.

There is a simple way to get a good grade in this course:

- **Read the readings.** All of the grading is designed to incentivize you to read and understand the material. The reason I do this is that I think reading and writing are the main way we all change how we understand the world and influence others. Virtually every reading in this course is one that deeply influenced my own perspective.

- **Think critically about what you read.** Every paper is wrong in some way. Usually it has major flaws or oversights. Your job is to figure out what the problems are and the limits of the argument. For the rest of your career, approach every paper or book with the idea that your job is partly to figure out why it is wrong.

- **Make notes and think about your essay answers along the way.** You will have some of the essay questions quite early. When reading the readings and taking class notes, write down your ideas and thoughts in real time.

## Grading scheme

After the first week, there will be a weekly assignment every week. These nine submissions will make up the majority of your grade along with participation.

*An essay or assignment is due every week on Monday, before class begins.* The only exception is Week 1, where there is nothing due. I will give you the assignment at least 1–2

weeks in advance. There is an exception for the first assignment. It will be due April 10 instead of April 8, to give you the benefit of an extra class with the conflict material.

Your TAs will grade your assignments, in consultation with the faculty. Note that Harris asks its faculty and TAs to stick as closely as possible to a specific distribution of final grades. This means final grades reflect performance relative to your peers in class. As a result, your final letter grade may not be the sum of your assignment grades over the semester. We will try to maintain a similar distribution throughout the quarter, to be as transparent and fair as possible, but please understand this is difficult to do with any precision.

**Lecture attendance (12%)**    Your TAs will circulate an attendance sheet during class. You are responsible for ensuring you sign it. You will not be penalized for missing one or two lectures, since everyone falls sick or has other obligations. Please consult your TA if you have more frequent absences. Do not sign for others.

**Game theoretic assignments (22%)**   Twice during the semester you will have a very short assignment that requires you to work out the logic of a simple game theoretic model of the material we are discussing in class. Each one is worth 11% of your grade. These are designed to be challenging but feasible for Harris MPP students who have done the analytical politics core classes. Non-Harris students who do not have this background: do not freak out or drop the class. The goal is not to give non-mathematical class-takers a zero. It's to walk you through the ideas step by step, so you get a sense of what it is all about. Your classmates and your TAs will be a resource for you.

**Essays (66%)**   Seven times during the semester I will ask you to submit a short essay in response to a question. We will grade you on the best 6, dropping your lowest grade. You can hand in all 7 if you want. If you hand in just 6, that is fine. Each of the 6 is worth 11%.

- I will provide the questions at least 1–2 weeks in advance.

- The questions draw on the required readings and the lecture material. You should feel free to bring in other material you know, but be sure to cite as well as you can. (e.g. "According to so-and-so in their book Great Thoughts, the reason for the war is..."). Cite well. It is rewarded.

- When grading, we will reward original insights, citing relevant work, critical thinking, and knowledge of the class material.

- You should prepare your answers mostly independently. You may discuss answers to the questions with classmates, and discuss the readings, but you should not prepare answers jointly, and you should not ask others to share their notes or detailed ideas. If you are asked to share your notes or detailed ideas, you should decline. In the past, sharing detailed answers has led to students have nearly identical exam answers, which at a minimum has meant a zero grade for both the giver and the recipient of answers.

## Other considerations

### Late assignments

The late penalty is one grade level per day. If you have a legitimate excuse for a late assignment (e.g. sickness) and want the penalty waived:

- Per Harris policy, sickness requires a doctor's note or similar

- Submit this to me and your TA by email, and cc your Harris student advisor.

### Re-grading policies

Feel free to discuss your grades with your TAs to get clarification. If, following such a conversation, you feel that an error was made, *please submit a re-grade request in writing to both TAs, by email, within two weeks of the assignment being handed back.* Please include an explanation or justification for the re-grade request.

### Developing reading & writing skills

Harris has some resources for students who feel they need help developing their academic reading and writing skills.

- For a reading assessment (and academic skills assessment in general), the best option at the University would be the Academic Skills Assessment Program (ASAP) .

- We also have the Harris Writing Program, which does not particularly focus on reading, but might indirectly help students get a better grasp of the written word and academic text comprehension.

- The English Language Institute also offers workshops and courses to help ESL students. Some are free, some are not.

### If you have personal problems

I understand that tragedy can unexpectedly befall people, and that personal lives and sickness intervene with normal life. I will do my best to accommodate you. I like to keep your program adviser in the loop. So any emails about missed exams, sickness, and related issues, please discuss this with your advisor and cc your advisor on any correspondence with me (or the TA you are talking to).

### Plagiarism

From the University of Chicago student manual:

It is contrary to justice, academic integrity, and to the spirit of intellectual inquiry to submit another's statements or ideas as one's own work. To do so is plagiarism or cheating, offenses punishable under the University's disciplinary

system. Because these offenses undercut the distinctive moral and intellectual character of the University, we take them very seriously.

Proper acknowledgment of another's ideas, whether by direct quotation or paraphrase, is expected. In particular, if any written or electronic source is consulted and material is used from that source, directly or indirectly, the source should be identified by author, title, and page number, or by website and date accessed. Any doubts about what constitutes "use" should be addressed to the instructor.

The Office for International Students has some excellent additional discussion of academic honesty.

In the context of this course, this means that you should prepare your exam answers mainly on your own. You should not prepare your answers directly from another person's notes. If someone asks you to share your notes, you should not do so, since this too carries consequences. Finally, in any exam answers, you should credit any ideas to their sources, even if this is relatively informal. For example, "As Acemoglu and Robinson argue..."

# Part II
# Weekly schedule and readings

This is a reading-intensive course. Each week I assign about 3–4 required book chapters or papers. There is no good textbook for the subject of political development. A selection of social science articles is the way that most Master's classes are taught in this subject. Most of these are "classic" articles or otherwise very influential social science pieces. Some readings relate more closely to the lectures, assignments, and essays than others. But all come from some of the most influential thinkers and contributions to the political economy of development, and I've selected them for this broader importance.

Some additional notes:

- You should read all required readings before coming to class. If people are not reading in advance, I will tend to lecture more and have less discussion over the quarter.

- Required readings are marked with *'s, where more *'s imply more importance. I list other papers because I may discuss them in the lecture, or in case you are interested in reading deeper on the topic.

- All readings are downloadable online through UChicago's network or from home on UChicago's VPN. The book chapters that are not on the Internet have Dropbox links. Please let me know if any links are broken and I will fix them.

## 1 April 1: What is political development? Why is it important?

- **Pages 23-65 of Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. "Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy." Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- **Sen, Amartya 1988. "The Concept of Development," Handbook of Development Economics, Volume 1, Edited by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, Elsevier Science Publishers.

- *Introduction and conclusion to Autesserre, Severine. 2014. "Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention." Cambridge University Press

- Chapter 3 of Ake, Claude. 2000. "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa." Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

- Martin, Courtney. 2016. "The Reductive Seduction of Other People's Problems," The Development Set, Medium.com, January 11.

- Chapter 1 of Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action. Oxford University Press, 2017.

- New York Times except from Singer, Peter. "The Life You Can Save: How to Do Your Part to End World Poverty." Random House Incorporated, 2010.

- James Ferguson with L. Lohmann. 1994. "The anti-politics machine: 'development' and bureaucratic power in Lesotho." The Ecologist 24(5).

# 2  April 3, 8 & 10: War and peace

- **Fearon, James 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49(3): 379-414.

- **Amos Sawyer. 2004. "Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River basin area." The Journal of Modern African Studies 42(03).

- *Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review 87(3): 567-576.

- *Pearlman, Wendy. "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings." Perspectives on Politics 11.2 (2013): 387-409.

- Blattman, Christopher, Alexandra Hartman, and Robert Blair. 2014. "How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education." American Political Science Review 108(1): 100–120.

- Tilly, Charles (1985). "War making and state making as organized crime," in Bringing the State Back In, eds P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

- de la Sierra, Raúl Sánchez. 2015. "On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." Working paper.

- Walter, Barbara. 2014. "Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 58(2).

- Chapter 1 of Wood, Elisabeth J. 2003. "Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador." New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a commitment problem." International organization 60.1 (2006): 169-203.

# 3  April 15, 17 & 22: Weak and strong states

- **Diamond, Jared. 1998. "The Evolution of Guns and Germs." In *Evolution: Society, Science, and the Universe*, edited by A. C. Fabian, Cambridge University Press.

- **Pages 1-22 of Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. "Political order and political decay: From the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy." Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- *Chapter 1 (please read up to at least *The challenges of the de facto state*): Dipali Mukhopadhyay. 2014. "Warlords, strongman governors, and the state in Afghanistan." Cambridge University Press.

  - A Kindle version of Chapter 1 is available on Amazon for free by clicking on "Send a free sample"

- *Bräutigam, Deborah. "Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance." IDS Bulletin 33, no. 3 (2002): 1–17.

- *p. 91-93* of Ekeh, Peter P. 1975. "Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement." Comparative studies in society and history 17(1): 91-112. (We will read remainder of article later in the class).

- Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa." International Security (1990): 117-139.

- Subrick, J. Robert. 2017 "The Political Economy of Black Panther's Wakanda"

- Tilly, Charles. "Coercion, Capital, and European States [1990]." 2012. In *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, edited by Craig Calhoun et al., 251–67. John Wiley & Sons.

- North, Douglass C. 1992. "Transaction costs, institutions, and economic performance." San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.

# 4   April 22, 24, & 29: Free and unfree societies

- Monty Python and the Holy Grail, "The Annoying Peasant"

- **Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2005. "Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth." Handbook of Economic Growth 1: 385-472. **(Focus on Sections 5 to 10)**

- **Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis & Barry R. Weingast. 2009. "Violence and the rise of open-access orders." Journal of Democracy, 20(1): 55-68.

- **Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Stanley L. Engerman. "Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the new world." Journal of Economic perspectives 14.3 (2000): 217-232.

- *Read **introduction** to Dell, Melissa. 2010. "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita." Econometrica, 78(6): 1863-1903.

- Mahoney, James. 2001. "Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective." Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (1): 111–41.

- Selectorate model in Chapter 11 of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. "Political Economy for Public Policy." Princeton University Press.

- North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2006. "A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history," National Bureau of Economic Research. 12795.

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty." Basic Books.

# 5  April 29, May 1 & 6: Society and the state

- **Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2013. "Power and politics: insights from an exit, voice, and loyalty game." Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan and Pennsylvania State University.

- **Acemoğlu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2016. "Paths to inclusive political institutions."

- **Chapter 1 of James Scott. 2009. "The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia." Yale University Press.

- *Blog post by Tabarrok, Alex. 2015. "The Ferguson Kleptocracy," Marginal Revolution (blog post, March 5).

- Dietz, Thomas, Elinor Ostrom, and Paul C. Stern. 2003. "The struggle to govern the commons." Science 302.5652: 1907-1912.

    - Elinor Ostrom interviewed on NPR Planet Money

- Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms." The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 137-158.

- Acemoğlu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2017. "The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States."

- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. "What makes democracy work?" National Civic Review 82(2): 101-107.

- Preface (p. ix-xxvi) in James C. Scott. 2012. "Two Cheers for Anarchism."

- Fukuyama, Francis. 2001. "Social capital, civil society and development." Third world quarterly 22(1): 7-20.

# 6  May 6, 8 & 13: A short history of world development and Western intervention

- **Chapters 2 and 8 of Migdal, Joel S. 1988. "Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World." Princeton University Press.

- **Bates, Robert H., John H. Coatsworth, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. "Lost Decades: Post-independence Performance in Latin America and Africa." The Journal of Economic History.

- **Ekeh, Peter P. 1975. "Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement." Comparative studies in society and history 17(1): 91-112.

- 

- *Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2004. "Economic Reform: Patterns and Constraints." Democratic Reform in Africa. The Quality of Progress: 29-63.

- Chapter 2 of Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. "Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism," Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Chapter 2 of Samuels, David J. 2012. "Comparative Politics." Pearson Higher Education. (especially second half of chapter on late state development)

- Robinson, James A. "Colombia: Another 100 years of solitude." Current history 112.751 (2013): 43-48.

- Heldring, Leander, and James A. Robinson. 2012. "Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa." Working paper.

- Huillery, Elise. "History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 2 (2009): 176–215.

- Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?" Econometrica 83, no. 2 (2015): 465–503.

# 7   May 15 & 20: Ending violence and establishing order

- **Introduction to Stewart, Rory, and Gerald Knaus. 2011. "Can Intervention Work?" W.W. Norton & Company. (The whole book is highly recommended)

- **Chapter 1 and 7 of Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. "Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War." Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- **Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. "Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective." Center for Global Development Working Paper 57.

- "The World Must Act Now on Syria: An Open Letter" The New York Review of Books, February 27, 2018.

- This debate on intervention in Sudan:

  - Mamdani, Mahmood. "Can the African Union Save South Sudan from Genocide?" New York Times, January 8, 2017.

- – Gettleman, Jeffrey. "Quandary in South Sudan: Should It Lose Its Hard-Won Independence?" New York Times, January 23, 2017.

  – Mamdani, Mahmood. "Responsibility to protect or right to punish?." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4.1 (2010): 53-67

- Fearon, James D, and David D Laitin. 2004. "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States." International Security 28 (4): 5–43.

- Chapter 1and Chapter 6 of Driscoll, Jesse. 2015. "Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States." Cambridge University Press.

- Easterly, William. 2008. "Foreign Aid Goes Military!" New York Review of Books.

- Shringarpure, Bhakti. 2013. "In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani." Warscapes, July 15.

# 8 May 22 & 29: State building from inside and outside

- **Grindle, Merilee S. 2007. "Good Enough Governance Revisited." Development Policy Review 25(5): 533–74.

- **Chapters 2-5 of Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action. Oxford University Press, 2017.

- *Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 2006. "An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa." Center for Global Development Working Paper 74.

- Pritchett, Lant. 2018. "Can Rich Countries be Reliable Partners for National Development?" Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD).

- Blum, Jurgen, Fotini Christia, and Daniel Rogger. 2016. "Public Service Reform in Post-Conflict Societies." Working paper.

- Chapters 5.2 and 11.3 of Mesquita, Ethan Bueno de. 2016. "Political Economy for Public Policy." Princeton University Press.

- Englebert, Pierre, and Denis M. Tull. "Postconflict reconstruction in Africa: Flawed ideas about failed states." International security 32.4 (2008): 106-139.

- Grindle, Merilee S. 2004. "Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries." Governance 17(4): 525–48.

- Mwenda, Andrew. Africa and the Curse of Foreign Aid (Video)

- Qian, Nancy. 2014. "Making Progress on Foreign Aid." Annual Review of Economics 3.

# 9    June 3 & 5: Fostering freedom

- **Easterly, William. 2011. "Benevolent Autocrats." Working paper.

- *Chapter 3 of Ake, Claude. 2000. "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa." Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

- *Introduction to Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. "Political Institutions under Dictatorship." Cambridge University Press New York.

- Sen, Amartya. "Democracy as a universal value." Journal of Democracy 10.3 (1999): 3-17.

- Fujiwara, Thomas. "Voting technology, political responsiveness, and infant health: Evidence from Brazil." Econometrica 83(2) (2015): 423-464.

- Naidu, Suresh. "Suffrage, schooling, and sorting in the post-bellum US South. No. w18129. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.

- Carothers, Thomas. "The backlash against democracy promotion." Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 55.

- Chapter 1 of Bush, Sarah Sunn. "The taming of democracy assistance. "Cambridge University Press, 2015.

- Hyde, Susan D. "Catch us if you can: Election monitoring and international norm diffusion." American Journal of Political Science 55.2 (2011): 356-369.

- Bidwell, Kelly, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. "Debates: Voting and Expenditure Responses to Political Communication." Unpublished paper (2018).

- Brancati, Dawn. "Democratic authoritarianism: origins and effects." Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 313-326.

- Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. "Making Autocracy Work." Working paper.

# 10    June 5: Conclusions

- **James Ferguson with L. Lohmann. 1994. "The anti-politics machine: 'development' and bureaucratic power in Lesotho." The Ecologist 24(5).

   - If interested, see this interview with Ferguson

- **Introduction and Chapter 10 in Scott, James C. 1998. "Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed." New Haven: Yale University Press.

- *Chang-Tai Hsieh "Crony capitalism with Chinese characteristics" YouTube video of a BFI & IMF talk (52:15). Paper version is here.

- Susan Cotts Watkins, Ann Swidler, and Thomas Hannan. 2012. "Outsourcing Social Transformation: Development NGOs as Organizations," Annual Review of Sociology, 38: 285-315.

- Andrews, Matt, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock. Building state capability: Evidence, analysis, action. Oxford University Press, 2017.

- Paul Seabright. 1999. "The Aestheticising Vice," London Review of Books 21(11), p.26-27

- Easterly, William. 2006. "The white man's burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good." Penguin Group USA.