Geographers at UCLA are using satellite images to suggest that U.S. may have taken credit where none is due for decreasing violence with the Iraqi troop surge.
From research reported in the New Scientist:
By comparing the amount of light produced at night in different areas of the capital before, during and after the 30,000 extra troops had been deployed, researchers from UCLA were able to track the movements of the warring Sunni and Shiite factions.
The amount of light was assumed to reflect the number of lights switched on in an area. Combining that with a map of neighborhood boundaries showed that the lights had dimmed much more in the Sunni dominated west and south-western regions of Baghdad. But this change began before the influx of extra troops. The light levels in four other major cities untouched by the surge remained constant or increased during the period.
Here’s what Patrick at iRevolution has to say:
The team at UCLA used four images taken on clear nights between 16 November 2003, well before the surge began, and 16 Dec 2007, after it had started, to draw their conclusions.
According to the project’s team leader, “it seems that it was sectarian cleansing that has led to the decrease in violence as the Sunnis were ‘cleared out.” It is particularly ironic that the satellite images used in the analysis came from a US Department of Defence weather satellite.
I’m not quite sure how to interpret light levels in relation to violence, but it could reflect the return of the displaced, more life on the streets, and more business. Or maybe it was a good week at the power plant. Interesting stuff, but perhaps a little premature.
The full article is here. Hat tip to Eric Green and his magical shared items feed.
3 Responses
This paper is really just a bunch of mean tests without controlling for much of anything. I imagine it would be possible to control for return of populations (if they can find the data) and decline in electrical service (which I think is their biggest problem). I agree this was published much too prematurely.
On the success of the surge, I always figured that it was really do to the fact that the US started bribing (or, technically speaking “hiring”) the Sunni (and other) militias to go after Al-Quaida, or just plain ol’ stay home, rather after American troops. Note that there’s really nothing wrong with this strategy, aside from the fact that it sounds a lot less heroic in the media.
It’s interesting that the change began before the troop surge, but I’d be interested to know if the rate of change was the same before and after the surge.