Working in Uganda in the early 1980s, I came to learn what it meant to live in a world of violence. Among the reasons my colleagues in the Ministry of Cooperatives welcomed the overthrow of Idi Amin was that with Uganda no longer a pariah state, they could now attend international conferences. And among the reasons they attended such conferences was that they could then sleep, for they need not fear the arrival of soldiers in the night.
Insights like this reminded me of something of which I was but fleetingly aware: not only the fragility of life, but also its political premise. I knew then that I would some day have to return to the issues to which that recognition gave rise.
Thus Bob Bates opens his new book, When Things Fell Apart. Now a senior professor of government at Harvard, he looks back at years of study and service to understand the roots of conflict and violence in Africa.
African states and societies developed distorted economies in the decades after independence. By the 1970s and 80s, these state structures were precariously perched. Bates describes the collapse that ensued: how plunges in commodity prices and pressures to democratize destabilized regimes, reignited old disputes, and plunged much of the continent into disorder.
What’s unusual about this book: it’s short, it’s readable, and it’s intelligent. Normally, if I get just two of the three, I’m thrilled.
Bates holds the same theory as I do: volatility in commodity prices drives conflict through the center, not the periphery. Falling prices don’t make rural farmers more willing to rebel; rather falling prices lead to falling state revenues, undermining the apparatus of control.
The problem: I think we both may be wrong. The data (so far) don’t support the theory. After many years in library basements copying numbers from ancient African statistical yearbooks, I have the numbers to test it. And so far: no result. Watch this space for more…
10 Responses
“Desire” is not, in itself, “willingness”. At any given time, we all have something we wish we could do, but can’t necessarily afford to do, and hence are not willing to do. If my life’s ambition were somehow to lead a peasant rebellion against the corrupt bastids in the capital city of my misbegotten nation, and that government happens to be weakened by low prices for the commodities that constitute much of its revenue, directly or indirectly, I might jump at the chance. But not getting the chance doesn’t mean I desire it any less. (Not in itself, anyway — there might be some “sour grapes” effect.)
I like when everyone argues.
By the way Blattman, do you plan on ever writing anything for the general public? Or is the blog enough for you?
They may not “come” from rural farmers but they are usually the ones that kill and die.
1. If they’re not the ones ordering and organizing the killings, they’re somehow not so important in the decision to rebel (or however you say it).
2. and often, they’re not the ones that kill and die. City people do it too. (I was about to say more often, but I have no data to back that up)
They may not “come” from rural farmers but they are usually the ones that kill and die.
If there was no “desire” to rebel, the apparatus of control would not be an issue unless it totally collapsed. What am I missing?
May be the fact that “rebellions” rarely come from rural farmers ?
These are all good questions, all tackled by the book. You wouldn’t want me to steal all of Bob’s thunder, would you?
“Falling prices don’t make rural farmers more willing to rebel; rather falling prices lead to falling state revenues, undermining the apparatus of control.”
If there was no “desire” to rebel, the apparatus of control would not be an issue unless it totally collapsed. What am I missing?
African states and societies developed distorted economies in the decades after independence.
Errr.. At best, it was at the beginning of the decade after independence. Or most likely, it was before independence.
The second sentence explains the first; falling prices create actual weakness of governments.
“volatility in commodity prices drives conflict through the center, not the periphery. Falling prices don’t make rural farmers more willing to rebel; rather falling prices lead to falling state revenues, undermining the apparatus of control.”
Could you please explain that? I don’t understand what you mean by driving conflict through the center instead of the periphery. Are you saying that falling state revenues lead to perceived weakness of government, which then leads to conflict/uprisings?