And is op-edding in the Washington Post:
The long-predicted national debate about national security policy has yet to occur. Essentially tactical issues have overwhelmed the most important challenge a new administration will confront: how to distill a new international order from three simultaneous revolutions occurring around the globe: (a) the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe; (b) the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and (c) the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
I might add a fourth revolution: the evolution of an economic world order where pockets of deep poverty and instability–namely Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia–persist as Latin America, South and East Asia, and North Africa and the Middle East catch up the wealth of the West. Global peace and security 100 years hence will center on these pockets of deepest poverty, and requires us to treat development in Africa and Central Asia as strategic priorities now.
2 Responses
Foreign Affairs for Mar/April has an article on China and India’s investment into Africa.
Poverty in Africa and Central Asia is not a “revolution.” And I’m not sure what is meant by “global peace and security 100 years hence will center on these pockets of deepest poverty.” Sure, it will depend on that, and on a lot of other things. It’s hard to know *how* it will depend on it. In strictly national-security terms, the poorest regions of the world have rarely posed much of a threat to the West. Also, I’m not sure what we– that is, the West, or the US, presumably Kissinger’s audience– can do to “treat development in Africa and Central Asia as strategic priorities now.” Without claiming that foreign aid is useless, an unsubstantiated charge I think, it seems to be a mistake to act as if poverty in distant places is a variable the US can control. And why should we worry about “100 years hence,” anyway? That’s our great-grandchildren’s problem. Chances are they’ll be richer and smarter than us, and they’ll be in a better position to deal with it.
What *is* a “revolution” is the surge in growth in the developing world. It’s a bit early to speak of “Latin America, South and East Asia, and North Africa and the Middle East catch[ing] up the wealth of the West”– they’ve got a long way to go (well, except parts of East Asia), and there have been false starts before. Still, many of the world’s developing regions already have a lot more economic clout than they did, and it’s a good bet their relative weight will continue to increase. Why are the implications of *that* for the world order? That’s the fascinating question.