I think the bigger problem is tackling state corruption, but it sounds like you want to institutionalise this. How do you actually build a functioning police force and judiciary while instructing it to turn a blind eye to these practices? Also what would be the proportion of international aid that you would allow politicians to steal (does it start at 50% in year one then go down to 30%, 20% and 10% in a five year period) and how should donors account for it?

One of the few projects that I would say has stood the test of time (unless someone is about to horribly disillusion me) is the NSP in Afghanistan, but the money was not given to the state there. The funds were administered by those pesky NGOs.

Fully agree that investing in state capacity should be a priority. And states should be given the chance to establish its authority. However, I have a few questions for conflict-affected countries –
1. Before deciding to strengthen the hand of the state – how does the international community determine if the current regime adequately represents the local population? Moreover, the international community is not homogeneous – each government/agency will have their own interests to protect/advance. And if the current regime doesn’t represent the majority, isn’t there a risk that strengthening law and order systems or implementing CDD might cause more harm than good?
2. Countries like India have an entrenched bureaucracy capable of resisting changing political winds to a large extent. In a post-conflict situation, that’s not quite the typical scenario? Of course, to argue either that the bureaucracy has to be strengthened first or the political rulers might be a circular argument
3. What about core infrastructure? Roads, public transport, banking etc? Are there good strategies to develop these capacities in a post-conflict state?

Why the big secrecy, they’re hardly groundbreaking insights?

With that in mind, what I’m looking forward to, is many more people/academics/researchers/commentators/activists/etc. looking into why so much aid and emergency response still act in oblivion to the obvious i.e. look into the politics of aid/interventions. I’m reminded of a recent seminar I attended, where Ngaire Woods and Robert Wade both gave persuading (although slightly differing) presentations about the situation of the World Bank, future challenges and why there’s an urgent need for reform. (Presentations are available for download
here.)

What was lacking, however, was a convincing analysis of how these circumstances would actually drive change. I’m not so sure the nature of supply and demand in this context gives much hope for any invisible hand. Rather, DAC members and the whole system appear to be locked in a position where change in societies is at the same time idylised, demonised and idealised. E.g. communities are Good, bureaucrats are crooks and we can manage and control it all if we could just only identify and ‘supply’ the right ‘resource allocation mechanisms’.

It appears to me that if this is to change, if we actually are to “shoot for the possible”, it would more or less have to presuppose a total change in our idea of knowledge, policy and a new social contract between electorate and governments.

Any thoughts?

The “law” you speak of is surely some narrower set of concerns, no? Do you mean the institution of courts for criminal law? I’d be curious to hear your elaboration, since “law” captures many things and the priorities post-conflict must be a subset of these.

Thank you very much for this post. I greatly appreciate the succinctness with which it puts entire aid effectiveness issue into perspective and offers practical solutions towards monitoring, transparency and accountability.

I’ve been tracking the huge amounts of international aid flowing into Pakistan for both relief and development for many years now. Moreover i’m keenly tracking the implementation of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. Especially the first tranche of $1.5 Billion.

I love the concept of ‘community-driven development’ but my experience in dealing with small local NGOs, doing great work at the grass roots level that deserves support, is that they lack the ability to access the big donors because they’re so localized and in turn the international aid agencies can’t seem to see beyond their noses.

Without proper checks and balances aid will disappear and be used for nefarious purposes as it has done in the past.

Most importantly thank you very much for pointing out: ‘Law, order and security come first. Unfortunately, freedom from violence, or access to justice, are not MDGs.’ Living and working in Pakistan for the last seven years i feel that rule of law or lack thereof is the core problem facing our society.

I’ll be quoting and referring to this post a lot in my dealings with international aid agencies, local NGOs and implementation.

Best regards,
Ayesha Hasan

They say a lot of the same things (and more). Especially with minimizing aid organizations setting up alternative bureaucracies, and using some of their resources, as well as whatever can be mustered, to build the state towards ten specific objectives.

This stuff is new to me, so would love to see what you think of their ideas.